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THE DODD-FRANK EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION PROVISION: WAS IT
EFFECTIVE, NEEDED OR SUFFICIENT?
RICHARD W. PAINTER*
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June
2010 that securities fraud suits could not be brought under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act against foreign defendants by foreign plaintiffs who bought their
securities outside the United States (so called “f-cubed” securities litigation).
The Court held that Section 10(b) reaches only fraud in connection with the
“purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.” Congress responded
to Morrison with Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act, which gives federal
courts jurisdiction over some similar cases if they are brought by the SEC or the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
This Article discusses alternative explanations for why Congress used extraterritorial jurisdiction language in Section 929P instead of directly addressing the
reach of Section 10(b) on the merits, and whether as a result Section 929P does
nothing more than confer jurisdiction on federal courts that the Morrison opinion already recognized courts have over all Section 10(b) cases. This Article
also discusses whether Section 929P reinstates for SEC and DOJ suits some of
the case law in the courts of appeals that was overturned by Morrison, and if so,
how that case law is to be applied. This Article discusses whether Section 929P
is retroactive, and how Section 929P likely will be used by the SEC and DOJ in
insider trading and other cases. Finally, this Article discusses whether Section
929P was necessary given the SEC’s already expansive enforcement authority
under Section 10(b) and whether Congress should have taken the opportunity to
address other more pressing post-Morrison issues in Dodd Frank. These issues
include the status under Morrison of securities listed both in the United States
and outside the United States, and the status of off-exchange traded securitybased swap agreements, as well as other private transactions where identifying
a transaction location is not as easy as it is for exchange traded securities.
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Buried in the thousands of pages of legislative text in the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)1 is a
provision a few paragraphs long responding to a United States Supreme
Court opinion handed down only weeks before the bill was signed into law
by the President. This provision was almost an afterthought, and was
awkwardly drafted, but it covered a topic of crucial importance—the
extraterritorial reach of United States securities laws. With the increasing
interdependence of securities markets around the globe, as illustrated by the
potential merger of the New York Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Boerse,
extraterritoriality will be a crucial issue in financial services regulation.
Because that issue is only briefly touched upon in Dodd-Frank, it may have
to be revisited by Congress in the near future.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank,2 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in June 2010 that securities fraud suits could not be brought under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against foreign defendants by
foreign plaintiffs who bought their securities outside the United States (so
called “f-cubed” securities litigation). The plaintiffs, who purchased shares
of National Australia Bank (“NAB”) on the Australia stock exchange,
claimed they had been deceived in Australia by statements of NAB about the
finances of a U.S. subsidiary and they sued NAB under Section 10(b). The
Court held that the alleged fraudulent conduct in the U.S. subsidiary was not
a ground to apply Section 10(b) extraterritorially to transactions in NAB
stock on the Australian stock exchange.
The Court held that Section 10(b) did not apply because “the focus of
the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but
upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”3 The Court
concluded that Section 10(b) reaches only fraud in connection with the
“purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”4
Congress responded to Morrison with a provision in Dodd-Frank that
gives federal courts jurisdiction in some situations over similar cases
brought by the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).

1
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
2
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
3
Id. at 2884.
4
Id. at 2888.
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Part I of this Article briefly discusses the holding in Morrison. Part II
discusses the extraterritorial jurisdiction provision in Dodd-Frank and
various explanations for why Congress chose to use the statutory language
that it did. Part III discusses complications that arise in interpreting this
provision of Dodd-Frank. First, does the statute do anything other than
confer jurisdiction on federal courts that the Morrison opinion already
recognized they have over all Section 10(b) cases? Does the provision do
anything to change the substance of the holding in Morrison? Second, if the
provision makes any substantive changes to the law, does it reinstate the
conduct and effects tests that were used in many circuit courts before
Morrison was decided, and if so, which version of these tests? Third, is this
provision of Dodd-Frank retroactive so that the SEC and DOJ can use it
against perpetrators of frauds that may have caused the 2008 financial crisis
or is it prospective only? Fourth, was the extraterritoriality provision of
Dodd-Frank necessary, given that the SEC and DOJ already have broad
enforcement powers under Section 10(b), and is there a risk that in those few
cases in which this provision does broaden the SEC’s and DOJ’s powers,
these powers will be used unwisely? Of particular concern is the
extraterritorial enforcement of United States insider trading laws. Finally,
Part IV of this Article discusses whether Dodd-Frank missed an opportunity
to clarify important issues that remain open after Morrison. One issue
Congress should have addressed is the status of securities that are listed in,
as well as outside the United States, but that are mostly traded outside the
United States. Another issue is the status of security-based swap agreements
in the United States that reference foreign traded securities as well as
security-based swap agreements in foreign countries that reference U.S.
traded securities. Congress could have addressed these issues in Dodd-Frank
but did not do so.
I. THE MORRISON HOLDING
The first part of the Morrison opinion sorts out confusion in the courts
of appeals about whether the reach of Section 10(b) is a question of subjectmatter jurisdiction or instead a question of the merits.
The Second Circuit had approached the issue in Morrison as one of
subject-matter jurisdiction. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
however, the briefs in Morrison were already considering this issue as going
to the merits of Section 10(b) rather than to jurisdiction.5 The Supreme Court
in late 2009 had decided Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers,6
5
See Supp. Brief for Respondents at 2–5, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) (discussing and citing cases and noting that this concept goes back to Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500 (2006), Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), Romero v. Int’l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
6
See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).
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holding—or rather, reiterating the Court’s prior holdings—that Congress determines the jurisdictional reach of a statute, that jurisdiction often exists
regardless of the merits of a case, and that courts cannot refuse to exercise
jurisdiction because they do not believe a claim exists on the merits.
Although Union Pacific was not a case brought under Section 10(b),
the Court’s reasoning in Union Pacific as well as in prior Supreme Court
cases cited in Union Pacific indicated that the scope of Section 10(b) was a
merits question, and not a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. The federal
courts have jurisdiction over all cases brought under Section 10(b); the question on the merits is whether there is a cause of action under Section 10(b) in
f-cubed cases. The Second Circuit thus should have decided the case on the
merits. Justice Scalia states in Part II of Morrison:
[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct
§ 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s ‘power to hear a case.’
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Gen.
Comm. of Adjustment, Central Region, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.
Ct. 584, 596, 175 L.Ed.2d 428 (2009) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006), in turn quoting United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)) [alternate citations omitted]. It
presents an issue quite separate from the question whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief. See Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946) [alternate citations omitted]. The District Court here had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate the question whether § 10(b) applies to National’s conduct.7
The next part of Justice Scalia’s opinion is the crux of the Morrison holding.
In it, the Court held that, even though the federal courts had subject-matter
jurisdiction, there was no cause of action on the merits where the securities
were not purchased in the United States (as explained below, there is confusion about whether the Morrison opinion supports applying Section 10(b) to
securities purchased outside the United States when such securities are listed
on a U.S. securities exchange). The Court refused to recognize the “conduct
and effects” tests that had been used in the courts of appeals to allow some
of these cases to proceed if conduct inside the United States was a substantial factor in causing fraud in a securities transaction outside the United
States. In cases falling outside the reach of Section 10(b), as defined in Morrison, a plaintiff’s complaint was to be dismissed on the merits under Rule
12(b)(6). The Court did just that in Morrison. The Morrison Court did not
directly address suits brought by the SEC or DOJ, but presumably the scope
of Section 10(b) would be the same in those cases also, because—absent an
express directive from Congress—the statute would not have a broader

7

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
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scope in one context than another simply because of the identity of the
plaintiff.
II. THE DODD-FRANK EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROVISION
As discussed below, Dodd-Frank appears to include a directive from
Congress that Section 10(b) should have extraterritorial reach in cases
brought by the SEC and DOJ. Extraterritoriality, however, was not the principal focus of Dodd-Frank. Instead, Dodd-Frank was the multifaceted legislative response to the financial failures, mostly occurring in the United
States, that led to the crisis of 2008–09. Dodd-Frank did many things to
regulate business practices, corporate governance, and disclosure, mostly in
the financial services sector. It also addressed the market in security-based
swap agreements and other derivative instruments. Extraterritoriality, for
Dodd-Frank, appears to have been an afterthought.
The Dodd-Frank Act included a provision responding to Morrison, but
the provision was inserted into the Act at the last minute because Morrison
was decided only weeks before the Act became law. Given the very different
approaches to extraterritorial securities litigation in the courts of appeals
prior to Dodd-Frank, it was difficult to predict what, if anything, the Supreme Court would do to change the law in Morrison. When the Court did
make a major change in the law, Congress had very little time to react. As
explained below, Congress was not careful in the language it used.
Congress responded to Morrison with statutory language directed at
cases brought by the SEC and DOJ and also ordered an SEC study of
whether extraterritorial private rights of action should be reinstated.8 Section
929P of the Dodd-Frank Act is under the heading “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws” and states:

8
Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the SEC shall solicit public comment
and then conduct a study to determine the extent to which private rights of action under the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act should be extended to cover the same conduct with
respect to which actions brought by the SEC and the United States are authorized under Section 929P of the Act. The study:

shall consider and analyze, among other things—
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it should extend to
all private actors or whether it should be more limited to extend just to institutional
investors or otherwise;
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on international
comity;
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for transnational securities frauds; and
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted.
The provision requires that a report of the study be submitted and recommendations made to
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of and the House Committee
on Financial Services within eighteen months. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y.
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Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78aa) is amended—
....
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts
of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation
of the antifraud provisions of this title involving—
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.9
The Act contains similar provisions with respect to Section 22 of the Securities Act and Section 214 of the Investment Advisors Act.
This provision expressly confers jurisdiction on federal courts in the
cases described in the provision. In this respect, however, the provision
merely reaffirms what the Court had said in Part II of Morrison,10 that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over all cases brought under Section 10(b).
As discussed in Part III of this Article, there is disagreement about what
else Section 929P of Dodd-Frank does. Does this provision also reach the
merits of a Section 10(b) suit brought by the SEC or DOJ and overturn the
holding in Morrison by applying Section 10(b) to some securities transactions outside the United States? Does this provision of Dodd-Frank reinstate
the conduct and effects test that the Second Circuit and many other circuits
had used prior to Morrison and, if so, how? All that is certain is that the
statutory language expressly affirms, as does Part II of the Morrison opinion,
that federal courts have jurisdiction over Section 10(b) cases brought in connection with the purchase or sale of securities outside the United States. The
focus of Part II of the Morrison opinion and the focus of Section 929P of
Dodd-Frank is the same: jurisdiction. The focus of the rest of the Morrison
opinion is the substantive reach of Section 10(b) outside the United States.
This aspect of extraterritoriality is not expressly addressed in Section 929P
even though Congress probably intended to do so.
There are at least four explanations for what Congress intended in this
provision of Dodd-Frank.
The first explanation is that Congress made a mistake in using the jurisdictional language, because Congress intended to address the merits of Sec9
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec. 929P(b)(2), § 27(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010).
10
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77.
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tion 10(b). Congress thus intended to define the scope of Section 10(b) to
include transactions outside the United States that are affected by the conduct inside the United States that is described in the statute. The statute was
drafted incorrectly, but this was for an explainable reason, because the courts
of appeals had for so long addressed the extraterritorial reach of Section
10(b) as a jurisdictional question. Presumably the drafters did not focus on
the fact that once this question reached the Supreme Court in Morrison it
was addressed in the parties’ briefs—including the Solicitor General’s brief
drafted by the SEC11—as a question of the merits rather than jurisdiction.
Nobody bothered to change the statutory language. Thus Congress, and the
SEC on which Congress relied for drafting advice, simply got it wrong.
Some of the legislative history supports this explanation of what happened. The language on extraterritoriality that was ultimately adopted in
Dodd-Frank is based on earlier bills that had been proposed before Morrison
was decided. Some members of Congress wanted to preserve f-cubed securities cases in at least some circumstances if the Court were to bar such suits
in Morrison.
An earlier version of what became the Dodd-Frank Act was the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173. Section
7216 of H.R. 417312 proposed to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction with
respect to antifraud provisions in the federal securities laws if there is “conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance
of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United
States and involves only foreign investors.” The bill covered the Securities

11
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 9, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) (“Thus, under the plain terms of Section 78aa, the
geography of an alleged fraudulent scheme—i.e., whether it was conceived and executed in
whole or in part outside the United States—is irrelevant to the district court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
12
§ 7216. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS.
(a) Under the Securities Act of 1933- Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15
U.S.C. 77v(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(c) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction- The jurisdiction of the district courts of the United
States and the United States courts of any Territory described under subsection (a)
includes violations of section 17(a), and all suits in equity and actions at law under
that section, involving—
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United
States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial
effect within the United States.

Identical language from (c) was added to Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78aa) and Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-14).
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§§ 7216(a)–(c) (as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009).
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Act of 1933, Section 22;13 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section
27;14 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Section 214.15
The language that ultimately made it into Dodd-Frank was apparently
drafted by the SEC and was substantially similar to the earlier language for
H.R. 4173, except that coverage was limited to actions brought by the SEC
or DOJ.
In all of these versions of the bill, the legislative language addressed
subject-matter jurisdiction. The language was not changed even though the
SEC and the Solicitor General acknowledged the previous fall that this
wasn’t a question of jurisdiction.16
Thus, the first explanation for what happened is that the SEC and Congress simply made a mistake. The Dodd-Frank provision had intended to
address the merits of Section 10(b) but did not.
A second explanation is that there was such a drafting mistake but that
some Members of Congress also were aware of this mistake and decided not
to redraft the statute. A reason for not redrafting could have been the pressing time constraints and the fact that redrafting the provision would require
substantive changes to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act as well as to the
Securities Act and the Investment Advisors Act provisions mentioned in the
provision. Some Members of Congress would have supported these changes,
but others might have refused to vote for a bill that went beyond jurisdictional questions to make substantive changes to these key provisions of federal securities laws. The ensuing debate might have held up the entire DoddFrank Act at a time when opponents of the bill’s other provisions were seeking delay and the President wanted the bill on his desk to sign. Fixing the
Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision would have been more technically
proficient, but was politically too risky.
The SEC and the bill’s sponsors, according to this explanation, thus
decided to retain the jurisdictional language as it was written and take their
chances. Courts, they hoped, would recognize that Congress had intended
substantive changes to Section 10(b) as well as jurisdictional ones. Otherwise the statute would be meaningless, and courts were unlikely to hold an
act of Congress to be meaningless.
A third explanation is that Congress—or at least some Members of
Congress—intended to confer jurisdiction and nothing more. These Members presumably would not have voted for substantive changes to the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) in SEC and DOJ actions. Although the
Supreme Court had ruled in Morrison that federal courts have subject-matter
jurisdiction in all Section 10(b) cases, these Members may have wanted to
codify this jurisdiction for the SEC and DOJ cases described in the statute.

13

See
See
See
16
See
14
15

15 U.S.C. 77v(a).
15 U.S.C. 78aa.
15 U.S.C. 80b-14.
Brief for the United States supra note 11, at 9.
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Congress thus ratified the jurisdiction federal courts have over these cases—
albeit jurisdiction that courts already recognized they had—but Congress
also left it up to the courts to decide what to do with this jurisdiction in
interpreting Section 10(b) on the merits. Congress had voted for a provision
that sounded tough but did not change the law. The Dodd-Frank provision
under this explanation is much noise signifying nothing.
If pressed, a Member of Congress who supported the provision on these
grounds could point to something it accomplished, although not very much.
The provision presumably would prevent SEC and DOJ suits in the future
from being dismissed on jurisdictional grounds if for any reason the Court
were to change its mind about its approach to jurisdiction in Union Pacific
and Part II of Morrison. Courts, under Section 929P, would have to accept
jurisdiction over SEC and DOJ suits, although they would dismiss these
suits on the merits under Morrison if there was no securities transaction
inside the United States connected with the conduct in question. Congress
could later decide whether courts’ application of Morrison in SEC and DOJ
suits was reasonable and whether to respond with substantive changes to
Section 10(b).
Members of Congress who supported jurisdiction and nothing more
could point to the fact that many SEC and DOJ lawsuits would survive Morrison even without any substantive change to the extraterritorial reach of
Section 10(b). The SEC or DOJ could, for example, sue defendants similarly
situated to NAB because NAB had American Depositor Receipts (ADRs)
trading in the United States. Nothing in Morrison’s interpretation of Section
10(b) on the merits would have stood in the way of such a suit. Furthermore,
courts might use their jurisdiction to narrowly or expansively construe Morrison in suits brought by the SEC and DOJ. There was considerable ambiguity in Morrison on several issues, including how to determine when a
transaction occurs in or outside of the United States,17 and it might be premature for Congress to address the merits of extraterritorial suits by the SEC or
DOJ before the courts of appeals had resolved these issues. For the time
being, Congress would only lock in the jurisdiction that the Supreme Court
had already said federal courts have and then wait to see what courts did
with this jurisdiction in SEC and DOJ cases, a context that was very different from the private suit in Morrison.
A fourth explanation is that Congress intended something very different: to address the extraterritorial application of federal securities laws as a
question of jurisdiction—as courts of appeals had done before Morrison—
and to address the merits of Section 10(b) by saying that federal courts have
jurisdiction over certain SEC and DOJ actions.18 Under this explanation, the
17
See infra Part IV, discussing how Congress should have clarified some of these issues
in Dodd-Frank.
18
This explanation of congressional intent, apparently favored by the SEC, was discussed
shortly after enactment of Dodd-Frank in Richard W. Painter, Douglas Dunham, & Ellen
Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to
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holding in both parts of the Morrison opinion was legislatively overruled in
SEC and DOJ suits. When Congress chose to overrule Morrison in this respect, Congress explicitly intended to reinstate the approach of the circuit
courts of appeals in SEC and DOJ suits, including their approach to this
issue as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Congress can do this because it has the final say on what is a question
of subject-matter jurisdiction. As the Court recognized in Arbaugh v. Y.H.
Corp.,19 Congress makes an issue one of subject-matter jurisdiction by affirmatively including the issue in subject-matter jurisdiction provisions. The
Dodd-Frank language, under this explanation, was not a drafting error but
instead was intended to codify the courts of appeals’ approach to extraterritoriality. The statutory language thus turns the extraterritorial issue into a question of jurisdiction rather than of the merits and says that certain SEC and
DOJ suits can proceed because there is jurisdiction.
Under this explanation, Congress intended to reinstate the case law that
had existed in courts of appeals before Morrison was decided. The courts of
appeals had approached extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional issue, despite
the Supreme Court’s contrary approach to jurisdiction even prior to Morrison
and Union Pacific.20 The courts of appeals had differed in their articulation
of the “conduct and effects” tests—the Second,21 as well as the Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits22 each articulating slightly different versions of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 n.21 (2010) (reporting that the SEC staff had told
the authors that the SEC staff was substantially involved in providing technical assistance to
members of Congress that included, among other things, explaining the Dodd-Frank provision’s intended effect of codifying the courts of appeals’ approach to extraterritoriality in SEC
and DOJ enforcement actions). Subsequently the SEC has asserted in briefs submitted in SEC
v. Tourre that Congress intended to reinstate the approach to the conduct and effects tests
embraced by the Second Circuit prior to Morrison. See infra note 30. The Second Circuit’s
approach in Morrison and prior cases included treating extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional
question rather than a question of the merits.
19
546 U.S. 500 (2006).
20
The federal courts have been less than clear in explaining that extraterritoriality is not a
question of subject matter jurisdiction. For example, in Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–13, the
Supreme Court pointed to one of its own decisions, E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244 (1991), in which it had characterized the extraterritorial effect of Title VII as jurisdictional, as an example of a decision in which it had been “less than meticulous” in distinguishing between subject matter jurisdiction and an ingredient of a claim for relief. See, e.g.,
Litecubes, LLC v. North. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“There is
no indication that Congress intended the extraterritorial limitations on the scope of the Copyright Act to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Accordingly, we hold
that the issue is properly treated as an element of the claim which must be proven before relief
can be granted, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”). Congress’s approach to
extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional question is thus in part due to confusion created by the
courts themselves.
21
Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975).
22
See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977); Cont’l Grain (Austrl.) Pty.,
Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979); Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76
F.3d 287, 290–91 (9th Cir. 1996). It is not clear which of these versions of the conduct and
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those tests—but they had all approached the issue as one of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Although the legislative history does not specifically say that
Congress wanted to address extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional issue instead
of an issue of the merits, or to combine the merits with the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction, Congress did know generally that the courts of
appeals had approached extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) one way
and the Supreme Court had approached it another way. Evidently, for SEC
and DOJ suits, some Members of Congress preferred the approach of the
courts of appeals.
None of these four explanations has clear support in the legislative history for the extraterritoriality provision of Dodd-Frank because there is little
legislative history other than a few isolated statements of Members and prior
drafts of the extraterritoriality provision from before Morrison was decided.
III. INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE DODD-FRANK
EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROVISION
A. Does Dodd-Frank do anything other than confer jurisdiction?
Courts interpreting the extraterritoriality provision of Dodd-Frank will
have to decide whether it does anything with respect to the merits of Section
10(b), and if so, what it does. As discussed above, all the provision expressly
does is confer jurisdiction, which is the same jurisdiction that Justice Scalia
says in Part II of Morrison that the federal courts already have. There are at
least four explanations for what Congress intended, some more plausible
than others, but probably no single explanation that is demonstrably more
plausible than the rest.
George Conway, counsel for NAB in the Morrison case, pointed out
this problem in a memorandum on July 21, 2010, the day Dodd-Frank was
signed by the President.23 Dodd-Frank, he pointed out, said nothing about the
issues addressed in the Morrison opinion other than in Part II. Dodd-Frank
said nothing about whether Section 10(b) on the merits reaches transactions
outside the United States. The Morrison opinion thus stood unchanged, even
in actions brought by the SEC and DOJ.
The SEC has responded by emphatically saying that the Dodd-Frank
extraterritoriality provision reinstates the “conduct and effects” tests of the
courts of appeals in actions brought by the SEC and DOJ.24
effects tests Congress intended to reinstate in SEC and DOJ actions. See infra, Part III.B of
this Article.
23
See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws
After Dodd-Frank: Partly Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged, June 21, 2010 (authored by George T. Conway III), available at www.wlrk.com/web
docs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763.10.pdf.
24
See SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Tourre’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 7 n.1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (SEC v. Tourre), 10 Civ. 3229
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2010), 2010 WL 4530690, at n.1.
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Only the third out of the four explanations above assumes that Congress
intended to address only jurisdiction. This explanation assumes that Congress intended to enact a provision that accomplishes little if anything at all.
The SEC will argue, probably convincingly, that this is unlikely. Of the remaining explanations of congressional intent, the SEC will likely prefer the
fourth because it is the only explanation other than legislative drafting error—at the SEC—that explains why the provision was written the way it
was. Regardless of the explanation of what Congress intended, the SEC will
probably be able to convince most courts construing the Dodd-Frank provision that Congress intended to change the law.
The SEC could point out that confusion on this issue is the courts’ own
fault. Up until Union Pacific in late 2009, courts of appeals had approached
extraterritoriality as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Congress in
Dodd-Frank used the framework that these courts had used to address the
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b). The courts of appeals had been
wrong in the view of longstanding Supreme Court precedent, but the courts
should not compound the problem by refusing to recognize a congressional
mandate because of drafting deficiencies in language modeled on the courts’
own case law.25
On the other hand, congressional intent is not what statutes are made of.
In this instance, reconstructing what Congress intended involves construing
substantive provisions of three complex statutes—the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act—as having been amended to
incorporate the conduct and effects tests used in the courts of appeals prior
to Morrison whenever an action is brought by the SEC or DOJ. Some judges
may refuse to do this; others may try to do this but create confusion by doing
so in different ways (see Part III.B, infra, discussing the different iterations
of the conduct and effects tests supposedly embodied in Section 929P of
Dodd-Frank).
Finally, the SEC could argue that because the Morrison Court ruled on
the scope of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act but not Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, Section 17(a), as originally enacted, applies extraterritorially
in SEC and DOJ actions. The SEC would urge that Dodd-Frank Section
929P be considered in interpreting Section 17(a) whether or not Section
929P in fact does anything other than confer jurisdiction. The problem with
this argument is that the Morrison opinion relies extensively on congressional intent in the Securities Act as well as the Exchange Act. Morrison

25
Another argument the SEC could make is that courts should interpret Section 10(b)
differently in SEC and DOJ suits in view of Dodd-Frank even though Congress did not amend
Section 10(b). In Dodd-Frank, Congress arguably gave affirmative indication that Section
10(b) should apply extraterritorially. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)
(statutory construction presumption against repeal by implication does not apply as strongly
where the “repeal” simply involves a judicial construction of a statute). This argument would
involve using a 2010 statute for judicial construction of a 1934 statute and some courts may
not be willing to do this.
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also clearly states that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to
both statutes, and indeed to other statutes as well. Courts are already using
Morrison to deny extraterritoriality in contexts well beyond the federal securities laws,26 so it is unlikely that courts would interpret Section 17(a)
differently than the Court interpreted Section 10(b). To the extent DoddFrank is relevant, the analysis circles back to the question of whether or not
Dodd-Frank changed the substantive reach of Section 17(a) and Section
10(b). Section 929P uses virtually identical language in the jurisdiction provision for both statutes, making it difficult to argue that Section 929P affected one differently than it did the other.
In sum, Congress has created a difficult problem by enacting extraterritoriality provisions in Dodd-Frank that only expressly provide for jurisdiction after the Supreme Court had said there already was jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction was not the issue, and that there was no case on the merits.
Congress did not change or explain the jurisdictional language it chose despite months of notice that extraterritoriality was seen by the Supreme Court
as a question of the merits rather than of jurisdiction.
It is uncertain how courts will respond. For the SEC, one ominous sign
is the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain, interpreting a
much older statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Alvarez says that the ATS was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a new cause of
action for torts in violation of international law. We think that
reading is implausible. As enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts “cognizance” of certain causes of action, and the term
bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law.
See, e. g., The Federalist No. 81, pp. 447, 451 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(A. Hamilton) (using “jurisdiction” interchangeably with “cognizance”). The fact that the ATS was placed in § 9 of the Judiciary
Act, a statute otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court
jurisdiction, is itself support for its strictly jurisdictional nature.
Nor would the distinction between jurisdiction and cause of action
have been elided by the drafters of the Act or those who voted on
it. As Fisher Ames put it, “there is a substantial difference between the jurisdiction of the courts and the rules of decision.” 1
Annals of Cong. 807 (Gales ed. 1834). It is unsurprising, then, that
an authority on the historical origins of the ATS has written that
“section 1350 clearly does not create a statutory cause of action,”
and that the contrary suggestion is “simply frivolous.” Casto, The
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Vi-

26
See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison and dismissing extraterritorial claims
under RICO).
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olation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467, 479, 480
(1986). . . .27
Still, the Court is uncomfortable with the notion that Congress, when enacting a statute with a jurisdictional provision, was not at least aware of a substantive cause of action for which the jurisdiction could be used. For the
Alien Tort Claims Act, the Court could look to the common law that existed
at the time of the Act and hold that Congress envisioned the grant of jurisdiction being used for something even if Congress was not creating a new
substantive cause of action:
But holding the ATS jurisdictional raises a new question, this one
about the interaction between the ATS at the time of its enactment
and the ambient law of the era. Sosa would have it that the ATS
was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a
further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action.
Amici professors of federal jurisdiction and legal history take a
different tack, that federal courts could entertain claims once the
jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in violation of
the law of nations would have been recognized within the common
law of the time. Brief for Vikram Amar et al. as Amici Curiae. We
think history and practice give the edge to this latter position.28
The problem with Dodd-Frank Section 929P is that Morrison predated the
statute, and under Morrison there is no substantive cause of action under
Section 10(b) unless there is a securities transaction inside the United States.
A court applying reasoning similar to that of the Court in Sosa would be
forced to find that Section 929P was “stillborn” in that it conferred jurisdiction that could not be used for anything substantive—in cases without a U.S.
securities transaction—until a further statute were enacted. Whether a federal court will so hold, despite the very likely congressional intent to the
contrary, remains to be seen.
Congress would help the SEC and DOJ, as well as the courts, avoid
litigation over this problem if it were to enact a new provision that clearly
states that it addresses the extraterritorial reach of these provisions of the
securities laws as well as jurisdiction.29
B. Does Dodd-Frank reinstate the “conduct and effects” tests?
If so, how?
If the Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision does anything substantive in addition to conferring jurisdiction, it probably reinstates the conduct
27

Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
Id. at 714.
See Comment Letter of Richard W. Painter to the SEC (Feb. 17, 2011) (on file with
author), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-7.pdf.
28
29
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and effects tests with all of their ambiguities. But which versions of these
tests and how shall they be applied?30
For conduct that has no demonstrable effect in the United States, but
that does have an effect on investors abroad, the controlling factor will be
the conduct test in subsection (b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank provision. In interpreting this provision courts will likely look back to the pre-Morrison conduct test which focused “on the nature of [the] conduct within the United
States as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme . . .”31
Prior to Morrison, the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits required that
more than mere “preparatory” conduct to the fraud occur in the United
States.32 The distinction between “preparatory” conduct and “substantial”
conduct, however, is an illustration of how confusing this version of the
conduct test was in practice. The Second Circuit had applied this test in the
Morrison case itself and was probably correct in finding that NAB’s alleged
conduct in the United States was at most “preparatory” to the alleged securities fraud and that a “substantial” component of the alleged fraud itself took
place in Australia and not in the U.S. However, what constitutes “preparatory” conduct and “substantial” conduct under the facts of any particular
case is necessarily determined by a court on an ad hoc basis, and therefore
litigants face great “difficulty in predicting the application of the conduct
test.”33 As Professors Choi and Silberman conclude, the “amount and importantly the qualitative type of conduct that must occur in the United States to
trigger the conduct test is uncertain.”34
The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had adopted a more relaxed approach, looking to whether the U.S. conduct has significantly contributed to
the fraudulent scheme.35 There was also confusion with this “significant contribution” approach as it is not clear how significant the U.S. contribution to
the fraudulent scheme must be for Section 10(b) to apply.
The Dodd-Frank language refers to “conduct within the United States
that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation.” The use of
the word “significant” hints at the more relaxed approach of the Third,
30
The SEC’s view is that Congress did adopt the conduct and effects tests in this provision
of Dodd-Frank, and the SEC points to the Second Circuit test in particular. See SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Tourre’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 7
n.1, supra note 24, at n. 1, stating: “In legislation recently enacted, Congress effectively overruled Morrison by codifying the Second Circuit’s long-standing conduct and effects test
(which Morrison had repudiated) for civil enforcement actions brought by the SEC. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat.
1376 (July 21, 2010).” The SEC did not, however, claim that this provision was retroactive
and thus contended that the transactions at issue in the Tourre case had taken place within the
United States and thus could proceed under Morrison.
31
Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
32
See, e.g., id. at 1046.
33
See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 492.
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977).
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Eighth, and Ninth Circuit, but the Dodd-Frank provision focuses also on
“steps in furtherance of the violation” which may—or may not—be more
than a “contribution” to the violation.
For transactions where the premise of the SEC or DOJ suit is a “foreseeable substantial effect” in the United States, as set forth in subsection
(b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank provision, the courts will probably return to the
pre-Morrison effects test. Here also there is ambiguity. Courts sought to define how much and what type of an effect conduct has to have in the United
States for Section 10(b) to apply extraterritorially. Courts generally required
that the effect of the fraudulent conduct abroad be on U.S. investors or U.S.
markets. For example, a transaction outside the United States might have an
effect on the trading price of a security inside the United States sufficient to
justify application of Section 10(b).36 The effect, however, cannot be too
general. The Second Circuit in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone thus held that “an
adverse effect on this country’s general economic interests or on American
security prices” did not generate sufficient effect to result in the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5.37
The Dodd-Frank provision in subsection (b)(2) now says that the effect
has to be “foreseeable and substantial” but does not mention that the effect
has to be on U.S. markets or investors or on securities transactions taking
place in the United States. The statute only provides that the effect has to be
“within the United States.”
For SEC and DOJ suits premised on conduct outside the United States
that has an effect on securities transactions in the United States, Section
10(b) probably applies even without this Dodd-Frank provision. Presumably
under Morrison a single securities transaction in the United States is enough
for Section 10(b) to apply to any fraud “in connection with” that transaction,
whether or not the effect on U.S. investors is “substantial.” The provision in
subsection (b)(2) of Dodd-Frank thus is superfluous whenever a connection
can be shown between a fraud anywhere and a securities transaction within

36
See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). In Schoenbaum, a U.S. shareholder of Banff Oil Ltd., a
Canadian corporation, alleged a violation of Section 10(b) claiming that controlling shareholders had arranged to purchase stock from the corporation in Canada for an artificially low price
and that the sale of undervalued stock in Canada would negatively affect the price of Banff
stock trading in the United States. The Second Circuit held that this negative effect on price
was an effect in the United States sufficient to justify the extension of U.S. jurisdiction. This is
one of many “effects” cases that, after Morrison, and even without Dodd-Frank Section 929P,
might still be pursued by the SEC under Section 10(b) provided there are identifiable U.S.
securities transactions in connection with the alleged fraudulent conduct outside the United
States. This is because Morrison makes it quite clear that the determining factor for deciding
whether Section 10(b) applies is whether there was a securities transaction inside the United
States. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austral. Bank, 130 S. Ct. at 2884–85. Section 929P also covers
another set of cases where there is a “foreseeable substantial effect” within the United States,
broad language that probably covers some situations even where there is no identifiable U.S.
securities transaction connected to the alleged fraud.
37
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the United States. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank provision requires that the effect
within the United States be “substantial,” a requirement that in some cases
makes the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement authority narrower than
the authority that the SEC already had.
The effects test in subsection (b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank provision only
broadens the SEC’s authority in situations where the SEC uses it to pursue
conduct outside the United States that has an effect inside the United States,
but where the fraud is not “in connection” with a securities transaction in
the United States. If the effect is still on a securities transaction taking place
in the United States, this set of cases would be very small because courts
interpret the “in connection with” language in Section 10(b) so broadly38
that any fraud that has an effect on a U.S. securities transaction is also likely
to be “in connection” with that transaction. Alternatively, the courts could
interpret the “effects test” language in subsection (b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank
provision more broadly and allow some SEC and DOJ enforcement actions
where there is only a more general effect on U.S. securities prices, although
not on specifically identifiable transactions, provided the effect is foreseeable, substantial, and predictable. Finally, courts could opt for the broadest
possible interpretation and jettison entirely the requirement that there be an
effect on U.S. securities markets. Under this interpretation, the provision
would allow SEC and DOJ actions against a fraud outside the United States
that causes U.S. investors to lose money in securities transactions outside the
United States. Interpreted this way, the provision is extremely open-ended,
giving the SEC apparent authority to pursue fraud on the London Stock Exchange that causes foreseeable and substantial harm to U.S. investors (given
the large number of U.S. institutions that invest in London Stock Exchange
stocks, such a showing might be easy for the SEC to make). Thus, depending
upon how it is interpreted, subsection (b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank provision (i)
is superfluous in that it covers very few instances in which the SEC or DOJ
could not have pursued an action anyway for fraud outside the United States
in connection with a securities transaction inside the United States, or (ii)
allows the SEC or DOJ to pursue fraudulent conduct abroad that has a substantial and foreseeable effect in the United States, but not necessarily on
easily identifiable securities transactions in the United States, or (iii) allows
the SEC or DOJ to pursue fraudulent conduct abroad that causes U.S. investors to suffer foreseeable and substantial losses in foreign markets.

38
In Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006), the Court held that “holder” class actions brought under state law by persons who did not buy or sell the securities they owned are
still “in connection with the purchase or sale” of a security and therefore are preempted by this
“in connection with” language in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.
This is the case even though there is only a limited federal cause of action under 10(b), because
the Court had ruled previously that a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of the securities in
question in order to sue under Section 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975).
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Given the lack of clarity in the statutory text, a sensible approach might
be for courts interpreting Section 929P to return to some version of the “effects” test in the courts of appeals, which generally required some specific
effect on investors or markets inside the United States. There might be a
small subset of transactions in which the SEC could find this enforcement
authority useful, but the SEC is unlikely to gain an advantage by using the
Dodd-Frank provision when it could also use a conventional method—either
a lawsuit under the Morrison construction of Section 10(b) for fraud in connection with a U.S. securities transaction or a proceeding under Section 30
of the Exchange Act (discussed in Part III.D below).
As several courts and commentators pointed out before Morrison, no
“cohesive doctrine” has arisen from the “conduct and effects” tests.39 The
Dodd-Frank provision is a “mish mash” of language taken from pre-Morrison opinions in the courts of appeals. In the conduct test in subsection (b)(1),
Congress missed a chance to define what conduct constitutes “significant
steps” in furtherance of a violation or how significant the conduct must be—
marginally significant, critically significant, “but for” significant or some
other type of significance. In the “effects” test in subsection (b)(2) Congress
missed an opportunity to specify what types of effects within the U.S. are
covered by the statute. Most of the pre-Morrison confusion in this area of
the law thus remains intact for SEC and DOJ suits brought under the DoddFrank extraterritoriality provision. The only way to avoid this confusion is
for Congress to amend the statute to be clearer about what it intends, or for
courts to refuse to recognize that the statute does anything more than confer
jurisdiction that Morrison recognizes the courts already have.
C. Is the Dodd-Frank provision retroactive?
A final interpretive issue is whether the extraterritorial provision of
Dodd-Frank is retroactive or prospective only. Can the SEC or DOJ use
Section 929P to pursue fraudulent conduct in connection with securities
transactions outside the United States before the effective date of DoddFrank? Probably not.
Statutes that change the definition of prohibited conduct are presumed
not to be retroactive. As the Supreme Court stated in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products:
[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted
in our jurisprudence . . . . Elementary considerations of fairness
dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what
the law is and confirm their conduct accordingly . . . .

39
See In re Alstom Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Choi
& Silberman, supra note 33.
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[T]he antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits application of penal legislation.40
Unless Congress specifies otherwise, statutes are thus deemed to be prospective only. “[W]hile the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule.”41
The fact that Section 929P addresses Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act—violations of which can be prosecuted
criminally—makes the case against retroactivity that much more
compelling.
Although the courts of appeals had been applying various iterations of
the conducts and effects tests for decades prior to Morrison,42 the law in this
area was hardly predictable before Morrison, and in any event Morrison
held that these appellate opinions were incorrect and that Section 10(b) did
not apply to securities transactions outside the United States.43 If Congress
changed the scope of Section 10(b) in SEC and DOJ actions in Section
929P, it would have had to have done so prospectively or at least to have
clearly stated that the provision was retroactive. Congress did not do so.
If the statutory language were only procedural, for example defining the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear these cases or defining some other procedural aspect of a Section 10(b) case having nothing to do with the prohibited conduct, this presumption against retroactivity probably would not
apply. For the SEC to argue in favor of retroactivity on these grounds, however, the SEC would have to acknowledge that Section 929P of Dodd-Frank
did nothing more than confer jurisdiction in SEC and DOJ suits. Such an
acknowledgment would imply that the provision had no substantive impact
on the extraterritorial scope of Section 10(b) itself. The SEC would then be
left with the Morrison holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over all
Section 10(b) cases, but no cause of action exists on the merits when the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States.
An important case where the question of retroactivity would be relevant
is the SEC enforcement action against Fabrice Tourre, a former Goldman
Sachs banker who allegedly orchestrated deceptive sales of synthetic mortgage-backed securities and security-based swap agreements by Goldman
Sachs to foreign banks. In SEC v. Tourre the SEC alleged that Tourre violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by making false and misleading statements in connection with these transactions as well as aided and abetted
violations by Goldman Sachs.44 The SEC refers to the Dodd-Frank extraterri-

40

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265–66 (1994).
Id. at 272.
42
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
43
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
44
Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (SEC v. Tourre), No. 10 Civ. 3229, 2010 WL
1508202 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010).
41
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toriality provision in a footnote to a brief in this case, but does not argue that
the provision is retroactive.45 The SEC instead argues that the security-based
swap agreements sold by Tourre and Goldman Sachs were transactions in
the United States under Morrison.46 It appears from this case that the SEC
will not try to argue that the Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision can be
used retroactively to pursue the transactions that took place at the time of the
2008 financial crisis. In the present round of enforcement proceedings, the
SEC will have to make the best case it can that the transactions in question
occurred inside the United States.
D. How much new enforcement authority for the SEC and DOJ does the
Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision provide?
How will it be used?
The SEC and DOJ did not need a provision that expanded the scope of
Section 10(b) extraterritorially to pursue most cases that relate to their core
mission of protecting U.S. investors and U.S. markets from securities fraud.
Furthermore, the extraterritoriality provision of Dodd-Frank may not have
provided the SEC and DOJ with much enforcement authority with respect to
securities fraud outside the United States that they did not already have, even
after Morrison.
Section 10(b) already applies whenever a single U.S. securities transaction is affected by the alleged fraud. National Australia Bank, for example,
had ADRs listed in New York and could have been sued by the SEC for the
fraud alleged in Morrison. Section 10(b), as construed in Morrison, also
gives the SEC or DOJ authority to pursue fraudulent conduct that affects the
price of just about any securities transaction inside the United States. Foreign companies lying to their investors while their securities—underlying
common securities or ADRs—are trading in the United States is one example. Foreign traders who make public statements or use transactions on nonU.S. exchanges to manipulate the price of securities traded in the United
States is another example. So long as there is a “connection”47 between the
fraudulent conduct anywhere and a U.S. securities transaction, the SEC or
DOJ would have a good chance of succeeding with a conventional Section
10(b) enforcement action brought against the perpetrator regardless of where
the conduct occurred.

45
SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Tourre’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings at 7 n.1, SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229, 2010 WL 4530690 at n.1,
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2010).
46
Id. at 6–10. See infra Part IV. The circumstances in which securities-based swaps and
other private transactions are transactions in the United States for purposes of Morrison is
another topic that Congress failed to address in Dodd-Frank.
47
Section 10(b) prohibits manipulative devices or contrivances “in connection with” the
purchase or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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Section 30 of the Exchange Act48 gives the SEC yet more enforcement
authority when fraudulent conduct in foreign markets is used by broker-dealers to circumvent U.S. securities laws. The Morrison opinion observed that
in Section 30 Congress specifically addressed those situations where the
SEC needs to protect investors in the United States against violations of the
Exchange Act in foreign trading markets. The Supreme Court explained that
Section 30(b) “seems to us to be directed at actions abroad that might conceal a domestic violation, or might cause what would otherwise be a domestic violation to escape on a technicality.”49
Thus, while Morrison and other f-cubed cases were important to the
size of the plaintiff class in private suits—an issue relevant to the compensation of plaintiffs’ lawyers—f-cubed cases were in most situations irrelevant
to the SEC’s enforcement authority. The SEC could sue under Section 10(b)
in any situation where U.S. securities transactions were also connected to the
alleged fraud. The SEC, furthermore, is not likely to have a good reason to
bring an enforcement action alleging fraud in securities transactions outside
the United States if there are no U.S. transactions that are also connected to
the alleged fraud. There may be a few cases where investors in the United
States are defrauded only through transactions abroad, but Section 30 already gives the SEC additional enforcement power in cases where a brokerdealer is involved in foreign transactions and there is an attempt to evade
U.S. securities laws. Because the SEC already has this authority to pursue
fraudulent conduct in connection with any U.S. securities transactions and to
pursue broker-dealer conduct abroad that evades U.S. securities laws, the
SEC probably did not need the extraterritoriality provision of Dodd-Frank to
carry out its core mission of protecting investors who are harmed in the
United States.
The Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision, assuming it does anything
other than confer jurisdiction, is open-ended compared with this targeted
authority that the SEC and DOJ have under Section 10(b) and Section 30.
48

Section 30 provides:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to make use
of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, any transaction in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or
is organized under the laws of, or has its principal place of business in, a place
within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of
this chapter.
(b) The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006).
49
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 286, 2882–83 (2010).
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Given that the SEC and DOJ can pursue most cases that impact U.S. markets
and U.S. investors without the extraterritorial authority in Dodd-Frank, what
will the SEC and DOJ do with this new provision?
One thing the SEC and DOJ may do with their Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement authority is pursue cases involving security-based swap
agreements and other similar transactions in circumstances where it is not
clear whether the transactions took place inside or outside the United States
for purposes of Morrison. The SEC v. Tourre case is one example, and indeed the SEC cited the Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision in its brief,
suggesting that it will probably use this new authority in cases where the
alleged conduct took place after Dodd-Frank was enacted.50 As explained
more fully in Part IV below, however, the SEC or Congress will sooner or
later, for the benefit of private litigants as well as the SEC and DOJ, need to
devise a workable test for discerning when a security-based swap agreement
takes place inside the United States for purposes of Morrison.51 The DoddFrank extraterritorial enforcement provision is a blunt instrument that the
SEC and DOJ can use to avoid this issue until it is resolved. An enforcement
approach that does not take into consideration the location of the swap
agreement, however, risks the SEC and DOJ using the Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision to prosecute cases in which the United States has no
genuine interest.
A second objective the SEC and DOJ might pursue with 929P is disgorgement of profits and other penalties in connection with securities transactions outside the U.S. when the same fraud also affected transactions
inside the U.S. In some cases, expanding the scope of monetary recovery
would expand the deterrent effect of SEC and DOJ endorsement actions.
A third objective the SEC and DOJ might pursue with the Dodd-Frank
extraterritoriality provision is enforcement of U.S. insider trading laws
abroad. The increasing number of foreign issuers doing business in the
United States creates opportunities for corporate executives, investment
bankers, consultants, and other fiduciaries to misappropriate information in
the United States and then use it to trade in foreign markets. Because the
SEC is more vigilant in enforcing insider trading laws than most foreign
securities regulators, and criminal penalties for insider trading in the United
States are harsher, such persons may attempt to evade enforcement by trading on inside information outside the United States. In response, the SEC
and DOJ could turn to the extraterritoriality provisions of Dodd-Frank. Indeed, even before Dodd-Frank, the SEC has pursued cases involving insider
trading in securities listed in the United States and abroad.52 Prior to Morrison, the SEC could, theoretically at least, have used the conduct and effects
50

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See infra note 67 and accompanying text, discussing ambiguities about the status of
securities-based swap agreements under Morrison and the need for this issue to be resolved.
52
See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. MacDonald, No. 09 Civ. 5352, 2009 WL 1683785
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2009) (alleging insider trading in the United States and Canada).
51
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tests to go after foreign transactions. The extraterritoriality provision may
now allow the SEC to go after some of the foreign transactions despite
Morrison.
Whether this is a good idea is another question. The SEC and DOJ
could use Section 929P to impose United States law on trading in foreign
securities markets whenever the alleged fraudulent conduct—here misappropriation of material nonpublic information—occurred in the United States.
The SEC’s and DOJ’s Section 929P authority would be in addition to the
authority they already have under Section 30 of the Exchange Act to pursue
conduct by broker-dealers in foreign markets that evades U.S. securities
laws, and presumably insider trading in foreign markets on the basis of information misappropriated in the United States is the type of conduct covered by Section 30. Does the SEC really need the authority to pursue persons
other than broker-dealers who trade on such information exclusively in nonU.S. markets or is this a question best left to foreign regulators, perhaps
working in conjunction with the SEC?
The difficulty with unilateral SEC enforcement of insider trading law in
foreign markets is that traders who misappropriate information in the United
States would be subject to one enforcement regime, whereas those who misappropriate information outside the United States would be subject to another enforcement regime or perhaps to no enforcement at all. Different
market participants would play by different rules depending on where they
received the information that was the basis for their trades. It is one thing to
expect worldwide compliance with U.S. insider trading law by broker-dealers already regulated by the SEC because of their operations inside the
United States, an end for which Section 30 was presumably designed. Is it
necessary or even desirable, however, to impose U.S. insider trading law on
other participants in foreign markets simply because they obtained some of
their information inside the United States? The governments and nongovernmental organizations charged with regulating non-U.S. securities markets
might not find U.S. insider trading law easy to implement. Investors in nonU.S. markets might also be troubled by the fact that their exposure to SEC or
DOJ investigation and prosecution turns on the location of the source of
information they use to trade, and whether or not the information was misappropriated inside or outside the United States, facts that might not even be
known to an investor at the time of the trade. Foreign issuers that do not
want their insiders exposed to U.S. insider trading law might respond to this
uncertainty by keeping important nonpublic information out of the United
States, which could mean a loss of business for U.S. investment bankers,
management consultants, and lawyers, as well as lost business opportunities
for U.S. companies.
Another set of problems arises because U.S. insider trading law is
unique in its reliance on case law without a statutory definition of illegal
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insider trading.53 Along with prohibiting corporate insiders from trading on
nonpublic information absent disclosure, Section 10(b) has been held to prohibit trading by corporate outsiders on the basis of information that has been
misappropriated in breach of a relationship of trust and confidence with the
source of the information.54 SEC rules attempt to define those fiduciary relationships in which the parties have an agreement or pattern of sharing confidences sufficient to give rise to insider trading liability under the
misappropriation theory.55 Persons who give tips with misappropriated information, as well as persons who trade on such tips, may be criminally and
civilly liable.56 The SEC enforces this insider trading prohibition civilly and
refers appropriate cases to the DOJ for criminal prosecution.
Enforcement, however, can be impeded by the difficulty of detection
and problems of proof. Information may be passed by a “tipper” to a “tippee” who then disguises trading by simultaneously making a large number
of other trades or by using complex derivatives instruments. If inside information is passed through several sources before trading, detection is even
more difficult. Furthermore, under Dirks the tipper or someone else must
receive an identifiable benefit in return for the tip to create liability.57 Prosecution of the tipper is difficult unless it can be shown that the tipper knew
that the tippee was likely to trade on the information in securities markets.58
These requirements make it difficult for the SEC and DOJ to investigate and
prove insider trading cases even when all or most of the relevant conduct
took place in the United States. The SEC and DOJ will confront further
obstacles when they take this enforcement regime into foreign countries
where traders, tippers, and tippees have allegedly engaged in conduct that
violates Section 10(b).
Effective enforcement will require the SEC and DOJ to have access to
trading data, electronic communications, and other information from foreign
53
See generally Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t
Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading after United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998)
(discussing ambiguities in U.S. insider trading case law).
54
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (lawyer violated Section 10(b) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 by trading in a company’s securities based
on information he learned about an imminent tender offer for that company by a client of his
firm).
55
The SEC has sought to clarify when a duty of trust or confidence exists in Rule 10b5-2.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2010). The rule provides that such a duty exists when a person agrees
to maintain the information in confidence, when there is “a history, pattern or practice of
sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should
know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality,” or when the information was learned from a close family member. Id.
56
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that to establish an insider trading
violation, tipper must be breaching a duty of trust and confidence with the source of the information and the tipper must receive some personal benefit in return for the breach).
57
Id. at 662–65.
58
See id. at 659; SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (ruling that
Rule 10b-5 does not apply to trading after overhearing a conversation containing material nonpublic information at a sporting event).
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countries. This evidence may not be easily obtainable if foreign financial
regulators and other law enforcement authorities do not cooperate. Cooperation will likely not be forthcoming if it appears that the SEC and DOJ are
pursuing not only persons who misappropriate information inside the United
States, but also other participants—tippees, tippers, traders, and accomplices—whose conduct occurred outside the United States. SEC and DOJ
enforcement actions will be particularly controversial if these same non-U.S.
persons would not be prosecuted under local law for trading on information
misappropriated from somewhere other than the United States.
Some of these insider trading cases could probably be pursued by the
SEC or DOJ through conventional means—in other words, without the
Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision—even when the trader does not engage in a U.S. securities transaction. These cases would involve a trader who
stands in a fiduciary relationship with shareholders trading in an issuer’s
shares inside the United States—for example, an officer or director of a
company with shares trading in the United States. The trading fiduciary
probably breaches a duty to disclose to his company’s shareholders the material nonpublic information once he has decided to use that information for
his personal gain. It should not matter where the fiduciary trades on the
information or where his tippees trade. If the information is material to the
U.S. investors’ trading decisions and the fiduciary has an obligation to disclose the information to them, the fiduciary has violated Section 10(b) in a
manner similar to any other corporate officer who lies to shareholders or
conceals from shareholders material information the officer is obligated to
disclose. These types of cases would pose practical difficulties if the SEC
and DOJ tried to prosecute not only the fiduciary of the U.S. issuer but also
the fiduciary’s tippees and accomplices abroad. The SEC and DOJ, however,
at least should not need the extraterritorial authority of Dodd-Frank 929P to
pursue the fiduciary because the securities transactions connected to the failure to disclose the information—and adversely affected by the failure to
disclose—would be in the United States.
However, the SEC and DOJ might need to use the extraterritorial reach
of Section 10(b) in Dodd-Frank section 929P where the trader who uses the
material nonpublic information does not have a fiduciary relationship with
persons who are trading in the same or similar securities in the United
States, but does have a fiduciary relationship with the source of the information. In these cases—often called “misappropriation theory” cases in U.S.
insider trading jurisprudence59—the trader or his tipper breach a fiduciary
duty by misappropriating information from one entity for trading in the securities of another entity with which they do not have a fiduciary relationship. The breach of a duty to the first entity, the source of nonpublic
59
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; Painter, Krewiec & Williams, supra note 53 (discussing
problems with the misappropriation theory and contrasting it to the approach in other
countries).
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information, is the premise for the Section 10(b) violation, and there is no
presupposed duty to the second entity or by extension to any traders in that
entity’s shares. In these cases, U.S. insider trading law protects sources of
material nonpublic information rather than U.S. securities markets.
This unique application of U.S. insider trading law may be justifiable
when misappropriated information is used in U.S. securities markets, as trading on misappropriated nonpublic information is believed to undermine the
integrity of securities markets. However, if only the misappropriation occurs
in the United States, and there is no U.S. trading in the relevant securities,
the U.S. interest in an insider trading enforcement proceeding is more attenuated. Foreign market participants, market regulators and governments may
even be hostile to the enforcement effort, particularly if the SEC or DOJ use
their authority under Dodd-Frank to go further than prosecuting persons who
misappropriated information in the United States. It is one thing for the SEC
or DOJ to prosecute a person who misappropriates nonpublic information
inside the United States and uses it for trading abroad or for tipping off
someone who trades, but it would be considerably more controversial for
U.S. enforcement authorities to pursue non-U.S. tippees trading on the information outside the United States. Foreign issuers would probably find the
misappropriation theory in U.S. insider trading law to be unfamiliar and unpredictable, and they might respond by keeping their important executives
and important business deals outside of the United States.
The United States thus probably should not try to unilaterally impose its
system of insider trading regulation on securities markets outside the United
States. It may be better for the SEC and Congress to recognize that other
laws would be more effective instruments for prohibiting misappropriation
of information inside the United States. Using the mail fraud or wire fraud
statutes to prosecute persons who misappropriate confidential information
inside the United States and sell it anywhere, or enacting a new statutory
provision to prohibit unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained inside the United States for purposes of securities trading anywhere,
are both viable options. Financial markets law is a particularly awkward instrument to accomplish this objective when a legitimate claim cannot be
made that the purpose of enforcement is protection of U.S. markets. The
SEC and DOJ furthermore might get further in combating global insider
trading by encouraging foreign regulators to be more vigilant in pursuing
insider trading while recognizing that different markets operate under different rules that define what types of insider trading are illegal and why. It
makes little sense for the United States to create a regime in which traders in
securities markets all over the world are subject to different rules depending
on where they get their information rather than where they trade.
More generally, the extraterritoriality provision of Dodd-Frank could
provoke adverse reaction abroad if the SEC pursues cases—whether insider
trading cases or any other cases—unilaterally. Coordinated enforcement
with foreign regulators would be more effective. The SEC and DOJ should
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not be perceived as attempting to set the enforcement agenda and perhaps
even the private litigation agenda in other countries.
IV. DID CONGRESS MISS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS OPEN
ISSUES ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY?
Dodd-Frank arguably missed an opportunity to clarify some important
issues that remain open after Morrison. These include the status of duallylisted securities, an issue that ought to be clear but is still being contested by
plaintiffs’ lawyers, criteria for determining whether private transactions take
place within the United States, the status of parties to derivative securities
transactions in the United States that are based on foreign-traded securities,
and the status of a transaction on a foreign exchange that is placed by a U.S.
customer through a U.S. broker-dealer. Congress could have dealt with all of
these issues but did not. Instead, Congress passed a provision that may not
do anything at all, and if it does something, it reinstates in SEC and DOJ
enforcement actions the confusion that existed under the conduct and effects
tests before Morrison was decided.
First, there is the status of dually-listed securities, those securities listed
both in the United States and in another country. Many Canadian companies
have common stock that trades on both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the
New York Stock Exchange. With the potential merger of the New York
Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Boerse, there may be more securities
listed both in New York and in Europe. Does Section 10(b) apply to trades in
these securities made outside the United States?
The logic of the Morrison opinion suggests that Section 10(b) should
apply only to transactions made in the United States. However, plaintiffs’
lawyers have seized upon a sentence Justice Scalia used to summarize the
Morrison opinion: “[a]nd it is in our view only transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities,
to which § 10(b) applies.”60 At the end of the opinion, Justice Scalia uses
similar language: “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of
any other security in the United States.”61 These two sentences, if read in
isolation, suggest that a security listed on a U.S. exchange is covered by
Section 10(b), even if that security is purchased outside the United States.
Under this theory, Section 10(b) would apply to a purchase of securities in
Germany on the Deutsche Boerse by a German citizen, simply because the
shares are of a class that is also listed in New York. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have
60

130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
Id. at 2888. Justice Scalia probably draws this language from the language in Section
10(b) itself: “the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
61
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claimed that as long as any shares are listed on a U.S. exchange, transactions
of the same class of shares on foreign exchanges are also covered by Section
10(b).62 So far most of these cases have been brought in the Southern District
of New York where judges have rejected this dual-listing argument and refused to recognize a cause of action for plaintiffs who purchased securities
outside the United States simply because the issuer lists securities of the
same class inside the United States.63
This is an important issue not just in private lawsuits but in SEC enforcement actions, at least those involving conduct that occurred before the
Dodd-Frank extraterritoriality provision was enacted. The SEC, in a recent
insider trading enforcement case involving transactions in Toronto, suggested that the trades “that took place on Canadian exchanges also fall
within the scope of Section 10(b), because as the Supreme Court recently
held, those transactions were of ‘a security listed on an American stock
exchange.’” 64
The dual-listing theory undermines the holding in Morrison, which focuses on the location of the transaction and clearly states that Section 10(b)
does not apply extraterritorially.65 Furthermore, allowing Section 10(b) suits
over dually-listed securities traded outside the United States is inconsistent
with an important policy rationale for the holding in Morrison: applying

62
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Concerning the Impact of Morrison v.
National Australian Bank at 10-16, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010).
63
See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2011 WL 590915
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ.
300, 2011 WL 167749, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2011); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., No. 03
Civ. 6595, 2010 WL 3718863, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010) (“[T]he most natural and
elementary reading of Morrison” is “[t]hat the transactions themselves must occur on a domestic exchange to trigger application of § 10(b).”); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, No. 09 Civ.
10087, 2010 WL 3119349, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010) (Morrison foreclosed claims of
plaintiffs who purchased Canadian Superior common stock on a non-U.S. exchange); Anwar
v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (deferring ruling on
whether Morrison applied subject to further discovery regarding whether the transaction occurred within the United States); Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citiqroup, Inc., No. 09 Civ.
7058, 2010 WL 3291579, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2010) (dismissing claims for financial
instruments sold on foreign exchanges and outside of the United States); Cornwell v. Credit
Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
64
See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (September 24, 2010) in SEC v. MacDonald, supra note 52, at 11, n.2, quoting Morrison. Perhaps
wisely the SEC only sought disgorgement of profits from trades in the United States and did
not seek disgorgement of profits from trades in Toronto. See id. at 11. It is thus unlikely that a
court will rule on this issue in that case.
65
Furthermore, NAB had ADRs listed in New York (traders in the ADRs were not parties
to the case in Morrison, and presumably could sue under Section 10(b)). Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
2869 (No. 08-1191) app. at 56. NAB’s registration statement for the ADR’s under the Exchange Act pertained to the “ordinary shares” because in order for a foreign issuer to list
ADRs for trading in the United States it must register the underlying shares with the SEC. The
Form 20-F included in the Morrison Appendix says NAB’s ordinary shares were “registered”
on the “NYSE”. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) app. at 58. Morrison held, however,
that Section 10(b) did not apply to trades in NAB’s ordinary shares in Australia.
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U.S. law to transactions on foreign exchanges would interfere with the laws
of other countries.66
Congress should have clarified this point by providing that the mere
listing of a security in the United States does not mean that all of the issuer’s
securities will be treated as if they were traded in the United States for purposes of Section 10(b). If courts were to reach a contrary conclusion, nonU.S. issuers would be encouraged to delist their securities in the United
States to avoid worldwide exposure to Section 10(b). This is one of several
post-Morrison issues that Congress could have considered in Dodd-Frank
but did not.
Another post-Morrison issue that Congress could have addressed in
Dodd-Frank is the status of security-based swap agreements and other derivative securities traded inside the United States that reference securities
traded outside the United States. Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Porsche
Automobil Holding SE 67 raises this issue. In Porsche, the plaintiffs were international hedge funds who bet that the value of Volkswagen AG shares
would decline by taking short positions in equities-based swap agreements
that referenced the common stock of Volkswagen AG, which traded in Germany but not in the United States.68 The plaintiffs alleged the swap agreements were entered into inside the United States, although they did not
identify the location of their counter parties.69 They sued Porsche alleging
that Porsche increased its share ownership in VW through October 2008,70
while denying its intent to take over VW. When, as a result of Porsche’s
allegedly deceptive conduct the price of VW shares rose, plaintiffs suffered
losses from their short positions in VW.71 Plaintiffs sued Porsche under Section 10(b) even though almost all of the alleged conduct occurred outside the
United States.72 Judge Baer dismissed the complaint and found based on the
totality of the circumstances that the transactions had not been entered into
in the United States and were thus barred under Morrison. Judge Baer found
that “[t]he economic reality is that Plaintiffs’ swap agreements are essentially ‘transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,’ and not
‘domestic transactions’ that merit the protection of § 10(b).”73

66
The application of Morrison to dually-listed securities is explored further in Painter,
Dunham & Quackenbos, supra note 18.
67
No. 10 Civ. 0532, 2010 WL 5463846 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010). For more extensive
analysis of the Porsche decision, see Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, The Aftermath of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche, 14 EUR. COM. & FIN. L.
REV. (Mar. 2011). For a general discussion of concerns in Europe about f-cubed securities
litigation before Morrison was decided, see Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Laws, 7 EUR. COM. L. 90 (2010).
68
Porsche at *1–2.
69
Id. at *2.
70
Id. at *3.
71
Id.
72
Id. at *1–3.
73
Id. at *6.
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The court reached a logical result—U.S. plaintiffs placing side bets in
swap agreements in the United States over the performance of foreign stocks
should not be permitted to use U.S. law to sue the foreign issuers of the
reference securities or other parties trading in the reference securities outside
the United States. However, the court did not articulate a workable test for
discerning which security-based swap agreements should be deemed to take
place inside the United States and which security-based swap agreements
should be deemed to take place outside the United States. Which of the following factors should determine the location of the swap agreement transaction: (i) the trading market for the reference security, (ii) the location of one
or both parties to the swap agreement, (iii) the currency in which the swap
agreement is settled, (iv) the place of settlement for the swap agreement, or
(v) some other factor or combinations of the above factors? Is it relevant
where the alleged fraudulent conduct took place, or does emphasis on that
factor circle back to the conduct test rejected by Morrison?
Although the facts of the Porsche decision gave significant weight to
the trading market for the reference security, it is not at all clear that Section
10(b) should always apply simply because the reference security is traded
inside the United States. Consider a swap agreement between two German
counterparties referencing a NYSE-traded stock. In order to sue under Section 10(b) should not the German swap parties have to establish that their
specific transaction took place in the United States? Is trading of the reference security in the United States sufficient ground to locate the swap transaction here as well, particularly if there is only a weak connection between
the alleged fraud and the reference security? What if, for example, the German swap parties sue the issuer of the NYSE traded stock for misrepresentations to investors, but the issuer did not even know that the German swap
existed when it made the alleged misrepresentation? What if the German
swap parties sue each other under Section 10(b) over the swap agreement
(for example, if one of them allegedly lied to the other about its
creditworthiness)? Is the mere fact that the reference security is traded in the
United States enough to give them a cause of action here instead of in Germany? Applying Section 10(b) to many of these scenarios is counterintuitive
and does not comport with the overall reasoning in Morrison, which is that
Section 10(b) protects investors who buy and sell securities in the Untied
States.
On the other hand, a stronger case for applying Section 10(b) could be
made if an executive of the NYSE traded company were to misappropriate
material nonpublic information from the company in the United States and
then enter into a swap agreement in Germany referencing the NYSE traded
stock. This conduct—someone entering into a swap agreement in Germany
using nonpublic information misappropriated outside of Germany—would
still be a concern principally of German securities laws but it is also a legitimate concern of the securities laws in the country where the information was
misappropriated, particularly if the reference security for the swap is traded
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in that same country and the swap agreement is entered into abroad in order
to evade domestic securities laws.74 Most insider trading cases, however, are
pursued by the government, not by private plaintiffs, and as pointed out in
Part III.D above, the SEC’s and DOJ’s extraterritorial enforcement authority
in Section 929P of Dodd-Frank—if held by the courts to have the substantive effect that Congress probably intended—would allow such an insider
trading case to proceed without the difficulty in analyzing the foreign swap
transaction under Morrison.
Finally, returning to the swap agreement in Porsche, what if the U.S.
parties to the swap agreement, instead of suing Porsche or Volkswagen, had
sued their counterparties over misrepresentations made by them inside the
United States about the terms of the swap agreement, the legality of the
swap agreement under U.S. law or about their own creditworthiness? A U.S.
court should not dismiss such a case under Morrison simply because the
reference security was traded in Germany. In that instance, the swap participants seeking protection under Section 10(b) would have invested their
money and lost it in the United States because of an alleged misrepresentation made to them in the United States. The underlying reasoning in Morrison does not foreclose such a claim.
Congress’s failure to address extraterritorial application of Section
10(b) to security-based swaps is curious given the attention paid to securitybased swaps in Dodd-Frank, which introduced a new definition of a
“swap” 75 and a new definition of a “security-based swap agreement”76 and
74
As pointed out in Part III.D of this Article, Section 10(b) could be held to apply to the
executive’s conduct regardless of where the swap occurred if there were also U.S. transactions
in the company’s stock and the executive had a fiduciary duty to disclose his foreign swap
agreement to the U.S. shareholders but did not do so. Furthermore, if an investment bank or
other broker-dealer is involved in the fraudulent conduct—for example in setting up the swap
for the NYSE company executive to facilitate insider trading abroad—the extraterritorial reach
of Section 30 of the Exchange Act would also apply.
75
Section 721(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act amends Section 1(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act by adding paragraph (47) to define a “swap” as:

any agreement, contract, or transaction– (i) that is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or
similar option of any kind that is for the purchase or sale, or based on the value, of 1
or more interest or other rates, currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of
indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests
or property of any kind; (ii) that provides for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery (other than a dividend on an equity security) that is dependent on the occurrence,
nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated
with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence; (iii) that provides
on an executory basis for the exchange, on a fixed or contingent basis, of 1 or more
payments based on the value or level of 1 or more interest or other rates, currencies,
commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures,
or other financial or economic interests or property of any kind, or any interest
therein or based on the value thereof, and that transfers, as between the parties to the
transaction, in whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change in
any such value or level . . . including any agreement, contract, or transaction commonly known as– (I) an interest rate swap; (II) a rate floor; (III) a rate cap; (IV) a
rate collar; (V) a cross-currency rate swap; (VI) a basis swap; (VII) a currency swap;
(VIII) a foreign exchange swap; (IX) a total return swap; (X) an equity index swap;
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which brought security-based swap agreements squarely under the federal
securities laws and the jurisdiction of the SEC, whereas they had before only
been subject to the antifraud provisions such as Section 10(b).77 For example, Section 9 of the Exchange Act prohibiting market manipulation has
been amended by Dodd-Frank to prohibit a broad range of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct in connection with security-based swap agreements,78 and the SEC has already promulgated Proposed Rule 9j-179 to
(XI) an equity swap; (XII) a debt index swap; (XIII) a debt swap; (XIV) a credit
spread; (XV) a credit default swap; (XVI) a credit swap; . . . (iv) that is an agreement, contract, or transaction that is, or in the future becomes commonly known to
the trade as a swap; . . . or (vi) that is any combination or permutation of, or option
on, any agreement, contract, or transaction described in any of clauses (i) through
(v).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
721(a)(21), § 1a(47), 124 Stat. 1376, 1666-67 (2010).
76
Section 761(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act creates Section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act,
which defines a “security-based swap” as, subject to certain exceptions:
any agreement, contract, or transaction that–
(i) is a swap, as that term is defined under section 1a of the Commodity Exchange
Act (without regard to paragraph (47)(B)(x) of such section); and
(ii) is based on–
(I) an index that is a narrow-based security index, including any interest therein
or on the value thereof;
(II) a single security or loan, including any interest therein or on the value
thereof; or
(III) the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence of an event relating to a single issuer of a security or the issuers of securities in a narrowbased security index, provided that such event directly affects the financial statements, financial condition, or financial obligations of the issuer.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
761(a)(6), § 78c, 124 Stat. 1376, 1756 (2010).
77
Both Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act prohibited fraudulent conduct in connection with security-based swap agreements prior to DoddFrank. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (2006).
78
Section 763(g) of the Dodd-Frank Act adds new subparagraph (j) to Section 9 of the
Exchange Act making it unlawful for:
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange, to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase
or sale of, any security-based swap, in connection with which such person engages
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice, makes any fictitious
quotation, or engages in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
763(g), § 9(j), 124 Stat. 1376, 1777-78 (2010).
Section 9(j) of the Act also states that the Commission shall “by rules and regulations define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such transactions, acts, practices, and
courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and such quotations as are
fictitious.” Id.
79
As the SEC recognized in its proposing Release, “[b]ecause such payments or deliveries occur after the purchase of a security-based swap but before the sale or termination of the
security-based swap” these payments and deliveries presumably should be addressed pursuant
to Section 9 of the Exchange Act rather than Section 10(b) which requires a purchase or sale of
a security or a security-based swap. Prohibition Against Fraud, Manipulation, and Deception in
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prohibit certain fraudulent conduct that occurs in connection with ongoing
payments or deliveries between the parties throughout the life of a securitybased swap.
Given the enormous increase in the amount of regulation imposed on
swap agreements and other derivatives in the United States under DoddFrank, the issue of when a swap agreement is deemed to occur inside the
United States for purposes of Section 10(b) should have also been addressed
in the Act. This question should not have been left up to courts applying
Morrison, a case which did not involve swaps but rather conventional transactions in a foreign stock on a foreign exchange.
An additional complication arises from the fact that the Dodd-Frank
Act requires some derivative securities to be traded on organized exchanges
in the United States.80 This makes it even more difficult to claim that a swap
transaction is outside the United States for purposes of Morrison simply because the reference security is traded outside the United States. The DoddFrank Act should have explicitly stated whether Section 10(b) applies when
swap agreements referencing non-U.S. securities are traded on U.S. securities exchanges, and whether Section 10(b) applies not only to defendants
involved in the U.S. swap agreements but also to defendants issuing or trading in the reference securities outside the United States (e.g. Porsche). Congress should have addressed these issues in Dodd-Frank but did not do so.
For example, Congress could have provided that for purposes of Section 10(b) a swap agreement entered into inside the United States that references securities traded outside the United States would be deemed to be a
transaction inside the United States only where the conduct alleged to have
violated Section 10(b) was in connection with the swap itself rather than in
connection with the reference security; otherwise, the swap agreement
would be deemed to be a transaction outside the United States. Congress
Connection with Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 68560, 68561 (proposed Nov. 8, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Proposed Rule 9j-1, thus provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with the
offer, purchase or sale of any security-based swap, the exercise of any right or performance of any obligation under a security-based swap, or the avoidance of such
exercise or performance,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or manipulate;
(b) To knowingly or recklessly make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to
knowingly or recklessly omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading;
(c) To obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(d) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Id. at 68568.
80
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, secs. 171(b)(7)(B)(i), 610, 124 Stat. 1376, 1438, 1611–12 (2010).
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could have also provided that for purposes of Section 10(b) a swap agreement entered into outside the United States that references securities traded
inside the United States would be deemed to be a transaction inside the
United States only where the conduct alleged to have violated Section 10(b)
is both (i) directly in connection with the non-U.S. swap agreement and (ii)
conduct that would also violate Section 10(b) if the transaction had instead
been in the underlying securities. Congress could then specify that to meet
the first criterion, the defendant would have to know about the specific terms
of the swap agreement and intend for his conduct to affect the swap transaction; mere knowledge that foreign counter parties are entering into swap
agreements referencing a U.S. traded security would not be sufficient.
Whatever Congress decides to do about the status of swap agreements
under Morrison, Congress is likely to do a better job at drawing lines more
precisely and more quickly than courts struggling to apply Morrison to a
context having little to do with the facts of Morrison.
If Congress does not act, the SEC should, through rulemaking, better
define when a swap agreement is deemed to occur inside the United States
for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Courts could conceivably
hold that such an SEC rule was inconsistent with their own interpretation of
the reach of Section 10(b)—the SEC could not, for example, by rule-making
alone overrule the Morrison court’s construction of Section 10(b). Nonetheless, a reasonable rule that applied Morrison to swap agreements would
probably receive considerable deference from the courts and would provide
some certainty to the markets.
Yet another post-Morrison issue that should have been addressed in
Dodd-Frank is a general rule for determining when a private transaction
takes place inside the United States in suits where one party is alleged to
have defrauded the other. This issue is at the heart of litigation between the
SEC and Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman Sachs executive whose conduct precipitated a separate SEC lawsuit against Goldman that has since settled.81
Tourre contends that the transactions—sales by Goldman to European banks
of synthetic collateralized debt obligations tied to subprime mortgages and
similar security-based swap agreements—took place outside the United
States because, among other factors, they were sold through Goldman’s
London affiliate pursuant to Regulation S, a Securities Act rule exempting
securities sold outside the United States from registration.82 The SEC contends that the Regulation S exemption is for registration purposes only, and
does not apply to antifraud statutes, and that the transactions took place inside the United States because they were conceived, structured, and marketed by Tourre and others from Goldman’s office in New York.83 A decision
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
81

See SEC v. Tourre, supra note 44.
See id. at 8–9.
83
Id. at 9–10.
82
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is imminent, and will then probably be appealed. Section 929P of DoddFrank, assuming it is more than just a jurisdictional statute, would allow the
SEC to bypass this issue in litigation over future conduct, but private plaintiffs’ suits will still be subject to Morrison. The Dodd-Frank Act should have
anticipated this problem and provided clear rules defining when a private
transaction takes place inside the United States. The place where a private
transaction is settled—regardless of the currency in which it is settled—
should probably be the predominant factor for locating the transaction inside
or outside the United States, although perhaps the parties should be permitted to contractually agree otherwise. Regardless of the rule that is chosen,
the rule would be more predictable if chosen by Congress rather than by
courts. If Congress does not address this issue, the next best option is for the
SEC to promulgate rules setting forth a reasonable interpretation of Morrison for private transactions and then to urge the courts to adopt it.
CONCLUSION
Congress passed a poorly drafted provision that may not do anything
other than confer jurisdiction that courts already have, although Congress
probably intended for it to do more. If this provision does do something
substantive, it reinstates much of the confusion that existed before Morrison
under the conduct and effects tests and it misses an opportunity for a clearer
articulation of those tests. The provision is in many situations not needed
given the SEC’s and DOJ’s already broad enforcement powers under Section
10(b) whenever fraudulent conduct anywhere in the world is in connection
with a single U.S. securities transaction, and also given the additional authority under Section 30 of the Exchange Act to pursue broker-dealers who
use transactions on foreign exchanges to evade U.S. securities laws. The
principal effect of the provision will be to increase the monetary penalties
that the SEC and DOJ can recover by allowing enforcement action to reach
outside the United States. Another area where the SEC and DOJ might use
the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement provision is to combat insider
trading, but these efforts could be problematic if the United States goes too
far in imposing its insider trading laws on foreign markets. Finally, DoddFrank missed an opportunity to address some critically important issues that
have arisen in the wake of Morrison, including the status of dually-listed
securities under Section 10(b) and the status of swap agreements entered into
either inside or outside the United States that reference securities traded either inside or outside the United States. In the few months since Morrison,
there has already been considerable litigation surrounding these issues, and
Congress may find itself addressing them sooner rather than later.
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